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Wakelam: Harris’s Scientists

F E AT U R E

Harris’s Scientists
Operational Research in Bomber Command
R A N D A L L WA K E L A M
Abstract : This essay describes the contents of a unique post-war
report, available online thorough LCMSDS, by the Bomber Command
Operational Research Section (ORS) in which the scientists described
their mandate, work and contributions to the RAF’s strategic and tactical
bombing efforts against Germany. While ORS reports are extensively
cited in various histories of the bombing campaign, the processes by
which the scientists did their work are not widely known; this essay
provides insights into these matters. The essay also gives historical and
historiographical context for both reading the report and appreciating the
work of Harris’s scientists.

D

is a unique
and amazing document that illuminates the Royal Air Force’s
(RAF) bombing campaign against Germany. The Ronnie Shepard
Fonds are best known for their material on British Army operational
research, but if you access Series 1, the digitised section of the
fonds online, you will discover within the Operational Research and
Strategic Bombing pages a copy of “Operational Research in Bomber
Command,” an extensive post-hostility summary of the origins, role
and results of the Bomber Command operational research team.1
The present article will, hopefully, give students of air power, the
RAF and military ethics an overview of operational research (OR) in
Bomber Command and context for the archival material.
eep in the laur ir military history archive

1  
LCMSDS Laurier Military History Archive “Operational Research and Strategic
Bombing,” accessed 15 February 2020, http://lmharchive.ca/operational-researchand-strategic-bombing/.
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In 1961 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office published the official
history of Bomber Command, The Strategic Air Offensive.
Written by Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, the history is an
impressive four volume set that describes in much detail the strategies,
campaigns, tactics and technologies which, taken together, cover a
span of approximately ten years.2 Two years later, in 1963, the office
of the Air Historical Branch published a relatively unremarkable
single volume entitled The Origin and Development of Operational
Research in the RAF.3 The link between its 200 pages and the
weighty tomes of the official history were and are not immediately
obvious, but in the thirty pages that the OR history devoted to Bomber
Command the reader got a flavour for the unparalleled challenges
that commanders faced and the assistance that the scientists of the
Bomber Command Operational Research Section (BC ORS) had
provided in finding problems for technical and tactical conundrums.
In essence, the Bomber Command chapter was the distillation of
an impressive manuscript, titled simply “Operational Research in
Bomber Command,” of some 620 foolscap pages which had been
prepared by the members of BC ORS in 1945.4 It is that manuscript
which is reproduced in its entirety in the Shepard Fonds and which
gives the reader a deep and broad sense of how the scientists and
flyers collaborated to bring both efficiency and effectiveness to RAF
strategic bombing operations.
This article looks at various aspects of the manuscript and
consists of three sections. The first introduces the reader to OR and
the context in which it was used in Bomber Command. The second
section looks at the structure and content of the manuscript itself.
A final section provides some recommendations for further reading
as well as a view on the whole question of the RAF’s bombing of
Germany.

2  
Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against
Germany 1939-1945, vols. 1 to 4 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961).
The ten-year span includes the period before the war when bombing policy and
capabilities were being developed.
3  
Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal
Air Force (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1963). Hereafter referred to as
Operational Research in the RAF.
4  
Basil G. Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” n.d., Ronnie
Shepard Fonds, Operational Research and Strategic Bombing, box 2, Laurier
Military History Archives. Hereafter referred to as “OR in Bomber Command.”
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operational research
In the broadest sense, OR has been described as “the use of scientific
method in providing executive departments with a quantitative basis
for decisions regarding the operations under their control.” In solving
problems, scientists and executives do not work in isolation; rather,
“[t]he good planner, the good executive with imagination, has to be
fully informed about…capabilities and limitations…[And] The good
operational research worker will inevitably find himself drawn (given
a not too hostile environment) into the planning.”5
During the Second World War, “[p]ast operations were studied
to determine facts, theories were elaborated to explain the facts, and
finally the facts and theories were used to make predictions about
future operations.” Frequently, the value of a quantitative assessment
of particular circumstances was in the opportunity to confirm the
commander’s intuitive conclusion with statistical analysis.6 Sir Robert
Watson-Watt, the British pioneer of radar, saw a role for OR in
confirming tactical efficiency. One needed, he said:
to examine quantitatively whether the user organization is getting
from the operation of its equipment the best attainable contribution
to its overall objective, what are the predominant factors governing
the results attained, what changes in equipment or method can be
reasonably expected to improve these results at a minimal cost in effort
and in time, and the degree to which variations in the tactical objectives
are likely to contribute to a more economical and timely attainment of
the overall strategic objective.7

Watson-Watt also formulated a short definition of OR stating simply
that it sought “maximum effect from available resources.”8

5  
Max Davies and Michel Verhulst, eds., Operational Research in Practice: Report of
a NATO Conference (London: Pergamon, 1958), 2.
6  
J.G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (London: Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 1947), 117.
7  
As quoted in Solly Zuckerman, “The Need for Operational Research,” in Operational
Research in Practice, eds. Davies and Verhulst, 8.
8  
As quoted in Davies and Verhulst, Operational Research in Practice, 2.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2020

3

Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 2
4

Harris’s Scientists

or across the raf
Operational Research in the RAF records that the RAF first used
operational research during the development and fielding of radar
for the air defence of Britain. While scientists such as Watson-Watt
focused initially on the technology, the techniques of employing the
system were also of fundamental importance and it was in this latter
analysis that OR played a central role. So valuable were these and
other contributions that, only weeks after the Battle of Britain, Air
Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
(AOC-in-C) of Fighter Command, asked for the first permanent OR
section (ORS) to be created in support of his command.9
At Coastal Command, scientists initially attached to those
headquarters to study airborne anti-shipping radar also investigated
the command’s very low rate of U-boat sinkings. In what is considered
among the “classics of operational research” (cited in many OR
monographs), the boffins, as scientists generally were called in the
RAF, were able to point out that both tactics and weapons were
flawed. The resulting changes to depth charge settings and explosives
resulted in an increase in sinking of near-surface subs from 2-3 per
cent in 1941 to 40 per cent in 1944.10

the bombers’ problem
Webster and Frankland wrote that the “operational requirements of
a strategic bombing force are easy to express and difficult to attain.”
First, a raid had to successfully penetrate enemy defences and
navigate to the target area. Then it had to pinpoint and effectively
bomb the objective and finally “return to base without suffering
more than a bearable casualty rate.” As the two authors further
explain: “The bearable casualty rate is a variable and a relative
factor which is influenced by the rate of destruction that can be
achieved. The greater the rate of destruction, the greater is the
casualty rate that can be sustained on each operation, for the fewer

Air Ministry, Operational Research in the RAF, 3-10.
Air Ministry, Operational Research in the RAF, 74-77.

9  

10  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/2
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will be the number of operations which are required.”11 In other
words, efficiency—Watson-Watt’s “maximum effect from available
resources”—was linked to success.
Initially problems were not recognised. For example, Sir Arthur
Harris, who commanded Bomber Command’s No. 5 Group early in
the war and was later appointed AOC-in-C of Bomber Command
in February 1942, said in his memoirs that there was no reason
to suspect the well-trained pre-war crews were not getting to and
bombing the target. Only with the introduction of bombing cameras
in early 1941 did sufficient evidence finally begin to accumulate to
identify “the enormous possibilities of error in navigation by night.”12
Thus, in the summer of 1941 the head of the RAF, Sir Charles Portal,
a former head of Bomber Command, welcomed an in-depth review
of air photos undertaken by the staff of Churchill’s own scientific
advisor, Lord Cherwell. The analysis concluded that on nights without
clear weather or moonlight, roughly one-third of all aircraft claiming
to have attacked their targets actually bombed within five miles of
the aiming point; that is, somewhere in a 75 square mile area. When
those aircraft that did not claim to have attacked were added to the
count, the effective rate was estimated at one-sixth of the potential
striking force of the raid.13 On 11 September, Portal recommended
the establishment of an ORS at Bomber Command Headquarters.14

officer in command ors and his mandate
Perhaps coincidentally, Harris’s predecessor, Sir Richard Peirse, had
requested the creation of an OR section in August. In defining its
mandate, he had said that “[b]roadly speaking, [research should
cover] the general study of operations with a view to determining
how the efficiency of operations in terms of bombs on target per
aircraft lost could be increased.”15

Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, Preparation: The Strategic Air
Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, 1961), 17-19.
12  
Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (Toronto: Stoddart,
1947), 80-81.
13  
Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 1, 178.
14  
Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford (London: Heinemann, 1977), 303-04.
15  
Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 2-6. Emphasis added.
11  
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Basil Gordon Dickins, author of Operational Research in Bomber Command,
photographed by Walter Bird in 1959. Dickins was only 33 when he became head of the
Operational Research of Bomber Command [© National Portrait Gallery, London]

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/2
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Dr. Basil Dickins, since the previous year tasked with producing
monthly analyses known as “Report[s] on Losses and Interceptions
of Bomber Command Aircraft,” was named section head.16 Dickins
had received his PhD in 1929 from the Royal College of Science
and soon after found employment at Royal Aircraft Establishment
Farnborough.17 In 1936 he was recruited by Sir Henry Tizard, among
the original RAF scientists, to work on the integration of radar
into the air defence system (specifically the control of ground-based
interceptors).18 By 1939, Dickins had been moved to the Maud Project
on atomic weapons.19 Given the importance of these projects, one gets
the sense that Dickins was seen by some of his seniors in the scientific
world as an up-and-coming researcher. The official historians seem
to confirm this, indicating that: “The appointment of Dr. Dickins as
head of the…Operational Research Section of Bomber Command was
an event of scarcely less importance than the widespread introduction
of night photography.”20 In his memoirs, Dickins’s commander, Sir
Arthur Harris, refers to Dickins only once, calling him both “brilliant”
and “young.”21

bomber harris
‘Butcher’ Harris, so called because of his apparent indifference
to casualties among his crews and German civilians, is often
mythologised as the cold, distant bomber baron who would dully
throw his crews, attrition style, against the German defences. Critics
believe that Harris did not have a quick intellect. “A good case can
be made,” historian Max Hastings explains, “that he was slow to
grasp the possibilities and limitations of the new generation of radar
technology” and that his staff were toadies. In Hastings’s view, “[t]

Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 1.
Directory of British Scientists 1964-65 (London: Ernst Benn Ltd, 1964), xx.
Dickins’s other post nominals included CBE, BSc, ARCS, DIC and FPhysS.
18  
Ronald W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (London: Phoenix House, 1962), 50-54.
19  
Clark, Rise of the Boffins, 87.
20  
Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 1, 251.
21  
Harris, Bomber Offensive, 133.
16  
17  
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Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T Harris, Commander in Chief of Royal Air Force Bomber
Command, at his desk in the summer of 1943. [© IWM TR 1093]

here appears to have been a chronic lack of open, critical debate…
[with] too many weak men and sycophants around the throne.”22
A different view was held by Charles Carrington, the army
officer assigned to Bomber Command HQ during most of the war.
Carrington had served in the Great War alongside Harris’s deputy,
Robert Saundby, and was well connected in academic and publishing
circles between the wars. Thus, he assessed Harris through the eyes
of a contemporary:
‘Bert’ Harris…was the most dominating personality with whom I became
acquainted in the Second World War. … No one doubted that he was a
master of his trade and had been so since [the last war]…With his power
of concentration on the aim, while excluding the irrelevant, he retained
a rugged common-sense…As I came to know him better…I realized that

Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979),
245-47.

22  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/2
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he was not unco-operative, [and once committed to an idea] even if he
opposed its inception, he gave his full support…23

Henry Probert, Harris’s most recent biographer, says that Harris had
“an intensively [sic] active and fertile mind eager to leave no stone
unturned in the effort to prepare…for the concentrated operations
that lay ahead.”24 We might well conclude that, while passionate,
Harris would have been open to sound counsel, even that which
might have run contrary to intuition or past practice.

“operational research in bomber command” – the
manuscript
In his report, Dickins set out to tell several stories, each of them
important in their own right for a reader to understand the complex
realities of Bomber Command, its headquarters, decision making
within the command, the contribution of science and of the scientists,
and certainly not least the terrible challenges and risks faced by the
crews on every raid. Briefly, the manuscript contains chapters on: the
creation, mandate, structure and integration of the section within
the headquarters; the collection and analysis of data, including the
evolution of techniques over the life of the ORS; the resolution of a
range of problems dealing with navigation, target finding and attack;
a similar range of problems dealing with the means of identifying
the causes of losses and finding ways to reduce them; and finally, a
chapter dealing with manpower efficiencies.
Reading through the online document on the Laurier Centre for
Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) website, the
reader will see that the manuscript was clearly a working draft. It
is written in a variety of styles, contains ink amendments and lacks
specific references for 5 to10 per cent of its footnotes; these are almost
without exception references to specific studies and reports generated
by the OR section.

Charles Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command (London: Leo Cooper, 1987),
85-86, 131.
24  
Air Commodore Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times (Toronto:
Stoddart, 2001), 95.
23  
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The document presents the accomplishments of the section
in thematic order, dealing with various problems as they were
investigated and resolved over the course of the ORS’s term. For the
more scientifically minded reader, there is an excellent and lengthy
chapter dealing with the processes of qualitative and quantitative
analysis, as well as one dealing with the development of the data
collection and processing techniques which permitted meaningful
and relatively rapid quantitative analysis of operations. Although
scientists and technicians associated with the section are identified
in the annexes, there is no discussion of personalities or mention of
which individuals would have worked on particular issues. Similarly,
while there is considerable reference to the process of preparing
and publishing reports, there are no samples or actual reports to
give a better sense of typical form or format. From the perspective
of understanding how the ORS headquarters worked, there are a
number of statements concerning the integration of the section into
Bomber Command headquarters. While we have only the scientists’
opinions, they concluded that after a period of adaptation they fit in
well and were accepted as part of the team. The following paragraphs
describe that integration as this working relationship was perhaps as
vital as the science itself.

doing the science
In describing the remit of BC ORS, Dickins wrote that the scientists
would from time to time receive high priority tasks from their seniors
but “normally the items for research originated in the section itself. A
detailed research program was prepared and occasionally submitted
to the Commander-in-Chief and the Senior Air Staff Officer for
approval and guidance as to priorities.”25
Initially there was some organisational trial and error, but by
early 1942 the ORS had been arranged into three sections: “Research
into success of Night Operations; Research into losses in Night
Operations; Research into Day Operations.” An ORS 4 was created
in mid-1942 with a broad mandate including the extremely important
production of the Bomber Command Quarterly Review and the
Bomber Command Raid Reports—publications which got important
Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 15.

25  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/2

10

Wakelam: Harris’s Scientists
WA K E L A M

11

new information and findings out to squadrons and crews. Radar and
manpower sections were soon added.26 The organisation grew from an
initial complement of just seven researchers to fifty-five scientists and
ten laboratory assistants by August 1943.27
Chapter Two of the manuscript describes the collection and
analysis of data. The placement of this discussion early in the body of
the history is significant, for arguably the legitimacy of the section’s
conclusions and recommendations had everything to do with the
soundness of its collection and interpretation of data. Amassing,
sorting and analysing information on both successful and failed
raids was a considerable task rendered more difficult by the fact that
Bomber Command was involved in a major raid—the equivalent to a
land or sea battle—several times a month. As Dickins explains, “[t]he
problem is to reconstruct the raid, compare it with the plan, and (if
possible) account for major discrepancies between them.”28 Initially,
data was insufficient to offer valid conclusions, but by the beginning
of 1943 Dickins was satisfied with the sample sizes being achieved
and, by later in the year, with the analysis processes.29
There were two types of analyses. Qualitative analysis permitted
the rapid estimation of tactical successes or failures and the results were
published as soon as possible in ORS reports which were distributed
within the headquarters and to the Groups involved. The product
of quantitative analysis, on the other hand, was a set of numerical
conclusions which were not all that well suited for publication. Yet
it was the quantitative data which permitted comparison of different
techniques and of the accuracy of attacks under different conditions,
while also permitting estimates of “the weight of attack required in
future operations.”30

boffins and bombers
As mentioned, the scientists were not working in isolation, but
rather in close contact with the RAF commanders and staff officers

Dickins,
Dickins,
28  
Dickins,
29  
Dickins,
30  
Dickins,
26  
27  

“Operational
“Operational
“Operational
“Operational
“Operational

Research
Research
Research
Research
Research

in
in
in
in
in

Bomber
Bomber
Bomber
Bomber
Bomber
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Harris and photographic interpretation officers study aerial reconnaissance photographs of
a recent raid in the Bombing Interpretation Room at Bomber Command Headquarters. [©

IWM HU 93068]

of the headquarters. It was Carrington’s general impression that:
“the warriors, generals and marshals, were, in their hearts, a little
afraid of these master-minds.”31 Yet aviators like Coastal Command’s
AOC-in-C Sir John Slessor and Fighter Command’s AOC-in-C Sir
Hugh Dowding were most appreciative of the contribution of their
boffins.32 The latter, as he departed from Fighter Command, sent his
scientists a note saying: “‘Thanks. This war will be won by science
thoughtfully applied to operational needs.’”33
In addition to continuous support from Harris, Dickins
indicated a close working relationship between the scientists and
the uniformed staff:

Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, 138-39.
Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 1956),
486-87.
33  
As quoted in Guy Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the Second World War (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 103.
31  
32  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/2
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It is important to stress that the Section functioned as an integral part
of the Command and worked in the closest collaboration with the other
branches of the Headquarters. In fact, it is not too much to say that
such success as was achieved by the Section was as much due to the
receptiveness of the Service as to the efforts of the Scientists.34

Not only did the service staff consider “the incursion of the scientist
into the field of operations…an innovation,” but Dickins also remarked
that once the scientists had learned the ropes “no proposal made by
the O.R.S. was ever turned down by the command on the grounds of
impracticability.”35 This was a bit of a stretch as there were a number
of conclusions and proposals which were not accepted. Generally,
these were not for reasons of poor science; for example, conclusions
about the nature of casualties as a result of flak were deemed too
sensitive to pass down to the flying units for fear of their impact on
morale.

the first year
One of the limitations of the “Operational Research in Bomber
Command” manuscript is that the scientists fail to describe the
complex nature of parsing useful conclusions from the tangle of factors
at play during a raid. The text simply does not allow the reader to
see how one set of raids could lead to a range of investigations and
recommendations. Nor does the structure of the manuscript give the
full sense of the complex interactions between the various tactical
and technical problems facing the crews and the Command. The
next few pages present a short summary of the ORS’s initial efforts
which allows the reader to get some sense of these circumstances.36
Within days of their arrival, the boffins were asked by the AOCin-C to sort out the causes of poor bombing accuracy, but they were
reluctant to do so, stating insufficient and “scanty” evidence.37 By the
Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” preface.
Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 13-14.
36  
For readers that wish to look at the working of the ORS and the headquarters
across the whole of the bomber war, see Randall Wakelam, The Science of Bombing:
Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press), 2009.
37  
Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 50.
34  
35  
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Tiredness etched on the face of a young Halifax pilot of No 405 (Vancouver) Squadron,
RCAF, after returning from an operation over Germany, July/August 1942. [© IWM CH 6627]

end of September 1941, however, they were able to make a definite
connection between the condition of the moon and a raid’s success.
They were still clearly concerned about the reliability of the data,
pointing out “the inherent unreliability of crews’ reports and the
danger of basing any conclusions as to the success of the attack on
these alone.”38 In December, the section concluded a large trial which
attempted to gain a better understanding of what crews actually
thought they were seeing at night. The scientists gauged from this
that there was a “big difference in the reliability of various ground
features.” Lakes and rivers, although very popular, had proved to
be particularly unreliable, while coastal features including docks
were relatively “trustworthy.”39 The boffins’ report was circulated
to all command organisations and emphasised the requirement to
focus on map-reading skills, both in theory and in practice.40 They
were evidently not shy to offer criticism but, as importantly, the

Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 51.
BC ORS Report No. 31, 14 February 1942, Air 14/516, The National Archives
(TNA).
40  
Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 52-53.
38  
39  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/2

14

Wakelam: Harris’s Scientists
WA K E L A M

15

headquarters staff did not shy away from getting scientific views out
to the flying stations.
Navigating to the target area and finding the target could both
be addressed to some extent, it was generally accepted, by the
operational use of the navigation device T.R. 1335, or Gee as it
had been dubbed. After the boffins had recommended that research
be conducted to find the best means of using Gee, the AOC-in-C
“entrusted” the scientists “with the task of drawing up detailed plans
for such experiments.” A plan was developed and two experimental
attacks, codenamed Cracker, were conducted on 13 and 20 February
over the Isle of Man to confirm the soundness of the nascent “Shaker”
attack protocol.41 A Shaker attack consisted of three waves: Geeequipped “Illuminators” to drop flares, incendiary dropping “Target
markers,” and finally the “Followers” to bomb with high explosives.
Just days after Harris took command, the procedure was tested
during the very successful attack on Renault factory at Billancourt
near Paris on 3 March 1942.42 What is fascinating to note is that it
had been the scientists, not the flyers on staff, who were given the
task of sorting out the operational use of Gee.
Concentration and the ability to use Gee to actually get the raid
to the target had been keys elements in Harris’ big raid on Cologne—
the first “1000 raid” on the night of 30 May. Prior to target selection
the ORS had done a detailed review of the previous year’s raids and
Dickins was called in to brief Harris on their findings. Ralph Barker,
author of The Thousand Plan, describes how the scientist went toeto-toe with his commander. Dickins was firm that the attack should
take place within Gee range and repeatedly recommended Cologne,
despite Harris’s desire to attack Hamburg which, as a port, Dickins
agreed would be easy to find. “At the end Harris said[,] ‘I still want
to take on Hamburg.’ ‘Stay within Gee coverage,’ advised Dickins.
‘Go to Cologne.’”43 The operation order for the raid continued to show
Hamburg as the primary target, with Cologne as the alternate,44 but
according to Barker, Harris had actually heard and accepted Dickins
Dickins, “Operational Research in Bomber Command,” 53-54.
Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 1, 385-88.
43  
Ralph Barker, The Thousand Plan: The Story of the First Thousand Bomber Raid
on Cologne (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), 44-48.
44  
“BC Op Order No 148, dated 26 May 1942,” Air 14/276, TNA. Of note, the attack
on Hamburg was planned for 60 minutes (16.7 aircraft per minute for 1000 raiders)
while Cologne was scheduled for 90 minutes (11 aircraft per minute).
41  
42  
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ORS Plot of Bomb Release Photos for an attack on Berlin in late November 1943. The
bombing has been scattered and largely missed the aiming point—the centre of Berlin with
its widespread industries and military headquarters. Analysis of every attack was essential
in allowing the operational decision makers to adjust tactics and procedures in order to
maximize the effect of raids. Detail from ORS B 186 Interim Raid Report on Berlin – 26/27th
November, 1943 (H2S Groundmarking), 31 December 1943. [TNA AIR 14/2686]

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/2

16

Wakelam: Harris’s Scientists
WA K E L A M

17

counsel: “He had come to rely on Dickins’s flair for finding out before
a raid what to expect from it.”45
Harris wanted the raid to be a big one because, as the boffins
had previously concluded, this was the only way to saturate the
defences. Yet he remained concerned because there was no prior
experience with concentrations of ten or more aircraft per minute.
After receiving ORS advice about the minimal chance of collision,
he concluded that: “It was obviously much better to accept such
a risk, which would mean that two or three aircraft were lost in a
really heavy attack, if by doing so we could prevent the loss of 40 or
50 aircraft from night fighters and flak.”46 In a letter to AOC-in-C
Coastal Command he wrote: “the risk of collision is, in my opinion,
more than counterbalanced by the complete confusion which will be
caused to the enemy’s locator system and gunnery.”47 As predicted by
the boffins, there was only one mid-air collision.
And so it went for three more years, with the scientists providing
invaluable findings and recommendations for Harris and his staff to
consider and act upon.

other readings
Several primary and secondary sources make direct or indirect
reference to the efforts of the ORS and connect it to other aspects of
the war including the development of technologies.
Three official studies should be noted. Previously mentioned,
the RAF official history, The Strategic Air Offensive, is frank
in its assessment of Bomber Command’s performance. It not only
describes what went wrong, but also provides explanations, often
citing ORS reports, although not by specific report number. Many
of the charts depicting specific raids are taken from ORS documents.
While not mentioned frequently, the existence and role of the ORS
is acknowledged by the official historians. Volume 3 of the Royal
Canadian Air Force official history, The Crucible of War, 19391945, details the participation of the thousands of Canadians who,
like other Commonwealth personnel, flew with the RAF during the
Barker, The Thousand Plan, 44-48.
Harris, Bomber Offensive, 85.
47  
Harris to Joubert de la Ferté, letter, 23 June 1942, Air 14/276, TNA.
45  
46  
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war.48 In Canada’s case, an entire Bomber Command group, No. 6
(RCAF) Group, was formed at the beginning of 1943. Published
thirty-three years later, the Canadian history also makes use of
ORS documents and charts and acknowledges the scientists. One
additional official history mentioned earlier is of note. The Origins
and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force
deals with the impact of operational research across the RAF. The
preface states that:
This monograph attempts to trace the origins and development of
operational research in the Royal Air Force immediately before and
during the last war and to illustrate the characteristic work performed
by each of the operational research sections attached to Commands at
home and overseas.49

One of Dickins’s scientists has also written on the functioning of
the organisation and his perspective is unique. In Disturbing the
Universe, Freeman Dyson explains some of what he saw, did and
thought as a junior scientist in the section.50 It is clear from his
commentary that he was unhappy with the area bombing policy,
with Harris for prosecuting it and with the ORS for not countering
the strategy based on research. A similarly critical appraisal of the
Command comes from another operational research scientist, Solly
Zuckerman, who worked extensively on bombing issues but was
never a member of the BC ORS.51
Other useful works focus on the tactical aspects and events of the
campaign. For example, Ralph Barker’s The Thousand Plan: The
Story of the First Thousand Bomber Raid on Cologne examines
the planning and execution of the first thousand-bomber raid and
uses oral histories from Dickins, Harris and Saundby.52 One recent
monograph describes the link between operational research, bombing
effectiveness and strategic debates. In The Bomber War: The Allied

Brereton Greenhous et al., The Crucible of War, 1939-1945: The Official History
of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
49  
Air Ministry, Operational Research in the RAF, xi.
50  
Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).
51  
Sir Solly Zuckerman. From Apes to Warlords: The Autobiography (1904-1946) of
Solly Zuckerman (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978).
52  
Ralph Barker, The Thousand Plan: The Story of the First Thousand Bomber Raid
on Cologne (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965).

48  
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Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany, Robin Neillands attempts to
determine why Harris and the Command are so widely criticised.53
He compares Bomber Command with the US 8th Air Force, since the
latter claimed to be able to conduct precision bombing. Neillands
wants to see not just what was done by Harris, “but why it was done
and whether, as so often alleged by Harris’s detractors, there was any
other way of doing it at the time” [emphasis in original].54 Without
looking at the operational researchers explicitly, he in fact focuses on
the very heart of the challenge facing the senior leaders.
An earlier work, The Six-Year Offensive: Bomber Command in
World War II, by Ken Delve and Peter Jacobs briefly discusses the
role played by the scientists.55 Describing the establishment of the OR
section the authors make a number of points, saying that the creation
of an organisation which could look at problems with a scientific
objectivity and then report on them candidly was long past due.56 At
the same time, the authors indicate that few outside the Command
headquarters knew of the section’s existence or influence and that the
work of the scientists “has often been ignored by historians.”57
A number of works deal with technologies and their use by
Bomber Command. In Echoes of War: The Story of H2S Radar,
Sir Bernard Lovell tells the story of this airborne radar and its
derivatives.58 Michael Cumming’s Beam Bombers: The Secret War
of No. 109 Squadron provides a parallel account of the radio beam
navigation system that was codenamed Oboe.59 Gordon Musgrave’s
Pathfinder Force: A History of 8 Group describes the employment

Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi
Germany (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001). Several works have examined the
strategic and moral questions which continue to be asked, but do not make reference
to operational research. See, for example, Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New
York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979); Denis Richards, The Hardest Victory:
RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War (London: W.W. Norton, 1995);
and Mark Connelly, Reaching for the Stars (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).
54  
Neillands, The Bomber War, 4.
55  
Ken Delve and Peter Jacobs, The Six-Year Offensive: Bomber Command in World
War II (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992).
56  
Delve and Jacobs, The Six-Year Offensive, 80.
57  
Delve and Jacobs, The Six-Year Offensive, 129.
58  
Sir Bernard Lovell, Echoes of War: The Story of H2S Radar (Bristol: Adam
Hilger, 1991).
59  
Michael Cumming, Beam Bombers: The Secret War of No. 109 Squadron (Thrupp,
Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998).
53  
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of these systems so that the reader can get a three-dimensional feel
for what took place and was seen by flyers in the night sky.60
Similar to these studies of technologies and techniques are those
works that examine the application of operational research to resolve
difficulties encountered in the field. In 1947 J.G. Crowther and R.
Whiddington published Science at War, a small volume designed
to tell the story of how scientists contributed to the conduct of the
war.61 Similarly, Ronald Clark’s 1962 The Rise of the Boffins was the
product of a desire to describe “the scientists’ war.”62 Two more recent
writings provide examinations of operational research in support of
the British war effort. Joseph F. McCloskey’s “British Operational
Research in World War II” is brief, but still detailed enough to make
clear the main constituents of operational research in all three British
services.63 More comprehensive, but less focussed, is Maurice Kirby’s
Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience
from the 1930s to 1970.64

some concluding thoughts – did operational research
influence decisions and so what?
The existing discourse on Sir Arthur Harris and Bomber Command
tells us much about the bombing campaign. But what we do not
yet adequately understand is how Harris came to make his tactical
and technical decisions, the decisions that affected the day-to-day
efficiency and effectiveness of operations and that ultimately made
his operational goals attainable.

60  
Gordon Musgrave, Pathfinder Force: A History of 8 Group (London: Macdonald
and Jane’s Publishers Ltd, 1976).
61  
J.G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (London: His Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 1947).
62  
Ronald W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (London: Phoenix House, 1962), xvii.
See also Ronald W Clark, Tizard (London: Methuen and Co, 1965).
63  
Joseph F. McCloskey, “British Operational Research in World War II,” Operations
Research 35, 3 (May-June 1987): 453-69. Two other post-war monographs on
operational research make mention of wartime activities: Patrick Rivett, Concepts
of Operational Research (London: C.A. Watts & Co. Ltd, 1968); and P.G. Moore,
Basic Operational Research (London: Sir Isaac Pittman & Sons Co, 1968).
64  
Maurice W. Kirby, Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience
from the 1930s to 1970 (London: Imperial College Press, 2003).
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From the ORS manuscript we can see clearly that while Harris
was undoubtedly the decision maker, at the same time he had access
to and accepted the advice of his operational research staff. Indeed,
Harris was certainly effusive about his boffins: “An Operational
Research Section is indispensable…[and] the work of the large research
section of my Command saved thousands of lives and hundreds of
aircraft.”65 He might have added that it rendered the work of the
Command more effective and efficient at the same time.
So what? Reading this manuscript gives a sense of the complex,
ambiguous and often chaotic circumstances of the bomber war and
the challenges that Harris and other commanders faced. That they
were aided in quantifying and qualifying these difficulties and
in developing solutions that could be practically applied speaks
much to the value of science and the hard work and dedication of
Harris’s scientists.
◆

◆

◆
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